THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894—95-570 orders to the Kwang-Ping, the torpedo boats andthe transportsin theYalu torejoin him,and headed for Port Arthur. The Kwang-Pingand the torpedo flotilla obeyed the order,but the five transports wereafraid to come out,andremained at anchor. As the sun set, the remnant of the Chinese squadron was steaming slowly to the south-westward. Well out to sea the Japanese heldon a parallel course,but in the night they lost touch of the Chinese. Ito seems to have madeno determinedattempt at pursuit. If he had wished he could easily have headed offthe retiring Chinese fleet and attacked again at dawn. But he can hardly- have been in acondition for such an enterprise. On the 18th he changed his course for Ping-Yang Inlet, where he could refill his magazines, put the wounded ashore, and send back the Matsushima, Hiyci, and zikagito Japan to repair damages. Ting's fleet reached Port Arthur unmolested, and he was joined there a few days later by his transports from the Yalu.

In the battle the Japanese lost in all 294 officers and men, out of a total force of about 3,000. Ten officers and eighty men werekilled, and sixteen officers and 188 menwounded. The Matsushimalost most heavily,having fifty-seven killed and fifty-four wounded, more than onethird of the total loss of the fleet. But it is strange that the Chiyoda, which came next to her in the line ofbattle, had not a single man killed or wounded. She was the only ship that escaped thus scathless, though the NaniwaKan, the last ship of the van squadron,was nearly as fortunate,having only one man wounded.

We have no such accurate record of the Chinese losses. At least 600 men,perhaps more, lost their lives on board the ships that were sunk andburned. The losses on board the two battleships that had borne the brunt of the fight for hours were very slight, showing in a striking way the value of heavy armour. The Ting-Yuen had had fourteen killed and twenty wounded,the Chen-Yuen seven killedand fifteen wounded. In all, the fleet must have lost nearly 800 men. The result of the battle was to leave Ito's fleet practically intact, while Ting's was reduced to the two battleships, a couple ct inferior cruisers,and the torpedo boats. Henceforth the Chinese only used the ships that had survived for harbour defence, and the Japanese acted as if they had secured full command of the Yellow Sea, boldly sending their convoys' transports across it, first to the Yalu, later to the Laio-tung peninsula and the Shantung coast, so had taken refuge in the mouth of the Yalu.

Away to the south-westward the Tsi-Yuen was steaming for Port Arthur,badly crippled. The Kwang-Chia, which had followed her,had gone ashore, and the King-Yuen and Chi-Yuen had sunk. On the Japanese side the Matsushima, theHiyei, the Akagi, and the Saikio had drawn out of the line, but seven of the cruisers and the old ironclad Fuso were still in action,concentratingtheir fire on the TingandChen-Yuen. They were fighting at a range of over a mile. Had they closedin and used their torpedoesthey might have destroyed what was left of the Chinese fleet, but they seemed very unwilling to risk a fight al torpedo range. Probably Ito did not like to give a chance to the Chinese torpedo boats, which he believed to belurking behind the squadron. After the battle it was said that theYalu fight hadproved that the protected cruiser could successfully engage battleships. But no such lesson couldbe drawnfrom the experiencesof the day;for, as wehave seen, the offensive powerof the two Chinese ironclads was very defective. What the fight did prove was the enormous power of resistance possessed evenby a second-ratebattleship. Here were the two Yuens exposed to the fire of the whole cruiser fleet, and yet practically uninjured and unsubdued. Their sides riddled above the armour belt,their upper works cut andpierced by the Japanese shells, and frequently on fire, they wereyet able to keep their guns in action behind the heavy armour of the barbettes, and to answer back, though slowly, the fire of the Japanese.

Before sunset,AdmiralItosignalled tohisfleet to cease firing and withdraw. He had no torpedo boats with him, and he didnot like to risk a night attack from the Chinese flotilla. Besides, he was probablyrunning short of ammunition. His guns had been hard at it for nearly five hours, and the quick-firer consumes shells at a terribly rapid rate. During the hottest part of the engagementthe Japanese had a difficulty not only in keepingup the ammunitionsupply, but inpreventing the empty copper cartridge cases accumulating inthebatteries. Men werespecially told off to get rid of them by throwing them down open hatchways, or sending them overboard. One may judge from this that towards sunset there were very few shells left in the magazines. Badly though hisfleet had suffered, Ting seems to have honestlyregarded the retirement of the Japanese as giving him the victory. He collected what was left of his squadron, sent