Facsimile · p. 582
THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894—95 548 weakpoint of the Japanese army was the want of a due proportion of cavalry. The result of this was that on several occasions the bulk of the defeated Chinese force got away, and their general, like Yeh at Asan, could boast of at least" a masterly retreat."
to be in this first fight they were to the end. The Chinese generals entrenched themselves in selected positions and waited to be attacked, their defencecollapsing ignominiously in almost every instance, as soon as it was seen that the Japanese were able to surmount the obstacles on which the mandarin generals had relied for protection. The Japanese,on the other hand, invariably adopted a boldly offensive plan of action. They tooktheinitiative. Theirsuperior artillery enabled them to seriously shake the Chinese defence, and then the infantry attack was launched— a flank attack threatening the Chinese line of retreat being usually combined with the frontal attack. This latter was mostly designed to be a mere demonstration or false attack, intended to keep the Chinese occupied while the flank movement was developing, but such was the eagerness of the Japanese soldiers thatit nearly alwaysbecame a realattack. The The Japanese left Asan on July 31st and re-entered Seoul on August 5th. Triumphal arches were erected, the captured guns and standardswereproudly displayed by the victors andeverything was done to impress theKoreans with the militarypower of their new protectors and masters. The battle hadbeen a smallaffair, but it was the first fight of the new army against a foreign enemy, and it inspired everyone in Japan with confidence in the result of the coming struggle. On land and sea victory had smiled on the banners of Japan,and these first successes were assumed to be the earnest of greatertriumphs yet to come.
THE DEFEAT OF THE CHINESE AT ASAN.
{Depictedby aJapanese artist.)