CHITRAL AND THE N.W. FRONTIER CAMPAIGN. 498 Chagru Kotal, the Goorkhas rushed forward, dashedacross the openground, not without loss, andbegan to climb the steep andnarrow zigzag beyond. As they neared the top they were in single file, Lieutenant Beynon, pistol in hand, in front. The Borderers dashed on to support them. But once the ridge was topped there was very little fighting, for the tribesmen had nowperceivedthe advanceofKempster'sbrigade along the summit of the cliffs, and were too anxious for their retreat to make a determined stand. The losses in ■the attack had been trifling, consideringthe strength of the position assailed. The Goorkhas had two killed and fourteenwounded, theBorderers one killed and five wounded. Kempster's brigade in its flank advance had had three men wounded, and had not onlyparalysed the defence of the ridge by its threat against the enemy's flank and rear, but had arrived in time to pour some deadly volleysinto the retreatingtribesmen.

Shinwari. Kempster's men hadbeenmarching and fighting for nineteen hours.

The losses in the retreat had been serious. The Gordons had Major Jennings-Bramly killed, and another officer and fourteen men wounded. -The 15th Sikhs had three killed and eleven wounded. Inother regimentsthere were one killed and five wounded. Thus the losses in the retirement were far heavier than those incurred in the attack of Dargai.

Both at home and in India this retreat from the heights of Dargai was severely criticised. It was explained that there had never been an intention of permanently occupying the heights, and that if the two brigades had bivouacked on the 18th on the ground they had won, there would have been the utmost difficulty in supplying them with food, water, and ammunition, while they would almost certainly have been attacked during the night by a large force of tribesmen. Moreover, Sir William Lockhart explained that he did not consider the possession of Dargai essential to an advance through the Chagru defile, but thought it wise to break up the tribal gathering on the heights before advancing, for the sake of the moraleffect on the enemy.

The enemy had abandoned the village of Dargai, and the two brigades, having met on the crest of the hill,proceeded to blow up the village towers, a covering party meanwhile holding a bold spur just beyond. Orders had been given that after clearing the ridge the troops were to return to the camp at Shinwari. It was late in the afternoon when this retirement began,and the troops had hardlyquitted the Dargai ridge when it was immediately occupied again by the tribesmen. Interpreting the retreat as a sign of weakness, they had recovered from the discouragement caused by their defeat earlier in the day. They not only opened fire from the cliffs, but they came pouring down to the lower ground, fired from behind every rock at the retiring troops, and as darkness began to come on, sometimes got within fifty yards of the rearguard, and seemed disposed to charge home at close quarters.

Supposing these reasons are valid,it is hardto understand why it was considered necessary to recapturethe ridge on the 20th,and why it was held for the rest of the campaign. If it was worthholdingat all,whynothave helditon the iSth? As for the moral effect on the tribes, the only result of the day's operations was that they were under the impression that theyhad scored a success, and during the following day they gathered 111 thousands on the ridge fromall the country to the northward. The Gordons,who had covered the retreat down thehillside on the 18th,had to storm that very ground two days later. The retreat fromDargai and itsrecapture meant a wholly unnecessary day's fighting, and 250 casualties. Besides, it had the unfortunate effect of shaking the confidence of the army in the Staff that directedit.

To GeneralKempster wasassigned the taskof covering the retirement, and he used for this purpose the Gordon Highlanders and the 15th Sikhs. Coolly and steadily, as if engaged in a field-day, these two fine regiments retired through each other's rank alternately, each holding its ground till the other had gained a favourable position further back, the rearward battalion answering the fire and checking the rushesof thehillmen withsteady rifle volleys. As the Chagru Kotal was approached, the pursuit was effectually stopped by the mountain guns. Then the brigades tramped wearily down to General Yeatman-Biggshadresumedcommand of his division on the 20th. It appears that th? actual order sent to him by Sir W. Lockhart was to advance by the Chagru defi'e to Khorappa in the Khanki Valley, but he decided that he could not take his division safely through the defile while the Dargai heights were held by thousands of hostile riflemen. It has been suggested by very competent critics that this was a badmistake ;that the movement through