476 CHAPTER VIII HOW CHAKDARA WAS SAVED.

TT J'HILE the tribesmen were attacking the \/\/ Malakand camp,they not only closely blockaded the fort at Chakdara, held by a garrison of about 250 men, but they made several attempts to capture it by escalade. Strong as the place was against an enemy unprovided the wonderis that the defendersof theplace did not lose moreheavily during the week's siege.

The only help that the Malakand garrison couldsend them arrivedat the beginning of the blockade, when twoofficers and twenty men of the Bengal Lancers succeeded, by making a detour over all but with artillery, its situation made the defence a very trying piece of work, and there was a serious danger that the garrison would be wearied out by continual attacks and at last overpow-ered when ammunition began to run short. The works to be held were, first, the fort, a strongly - walled building armedwith a nine-pounder and a Maxim; secondly, the signal tower higher up the spur of the hill on which the fort stood, and separated fromit bysome 'open rocky ground; and, thirdly, a gateway impassable ground, in reachingthegateway of the bridge and joiningthehardpressed garrison. After the failure of the first attach the Malakand the tribesmen concentratednearlyalltheir force round Chakdara. It is believed that on August ist and 2nd there were more than ten thousand armed men gathered round the fort. For two days the signal tower was i- Iited from the main work, and it was impossible even to send water to the handful of brave men who held it. The unfortunate men in the tower AN AFR1DI N.C.O. KIIYIXR RIFLES) fortified bytwo towers and armed with another Maxim at the further end of the longsuspension bridge over the Swat River. From the high ground above the fort the besiegers could actually see into it and bring rifle sire to bear on the walls and towers and a considerable part of the interior enclosure. They could also fire down on the roof of the sisrnal tower, so that to work the heliostat meant to risk the lives of the signallers. Lower down the hill on both sides of the fort there was good cover for theattack. Under these circumstances repeatedly signalled to the fort for water, but for forty-eight hours of blazing Indian weather not a drop could be sent to them. On August ist LieutenantRattray, the commandant of the fort,noted in his official report:— " Matters lookedso serious that we decided to send an urgent appeal for help (to the Malakand), but owing to the difficulty and danger of signalling we could not send a longmessage,andmade i; as short as possible,merely sending the two words,'Help us!' " This was one of the few messages that got