447 CHAPTER III.

THE ADVANCE OVER THE MALAKAND PASS.

THE plans adopted by the Indian Government for the relief of Chitral included two expeditions. A small force under Colonel Kelly was to endeavour to cross the snowy Shandur Pass from Gilgit and approach the beleaguered hill-fort from the northward. This was intended as a diversion to diminish the resistance to the more powerful force, some i;,ooo strong, which was assembling near Peshawur and was to inarch through Swat and Bajaur into the south of the Chitral Valley. This army would have to cross four passes and three swollen mountain rivers on its way,and the country through which it had to move was mostly- unsurveved and knownonly through the reportsof native travellers. It was generally- believed that the besieged garrison couldnot have provisions that wouldlast longer than the end of April. The enemy's forces might be 30,000 strong. The difficulties of the operation were therefore serious, and success by no meanscertain. Itis truethat no onedoubted our power to conquer Chitral, but our 1 1 was not to do this, but to get to the capital before it fell into the hands of Umra Khan and his friend,Sher Afzul.

The commandof the main relievingforce was given to General Sir Robert Low, withGeneral Bindon Blood, R.E., as his chief of the staff.

The following was the composition of Low's army. The infantry was organised in three brigades, each composedof two Briti.-h and two native battalions:— ist Brigade: General A. A. Kinloch, C.B. King's Royal Rifles ; Bedfordshire Regiment ; 15th Sikhs;37thDogra-2nd Brigade: General H. G. Waterfield. GordonHighlanders;ScottishBorderers;Guides' Infantry ;4th Sikhs.

3rd Brigade:General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O. Seaforth Highlanders; Buffs ; 4th Goorkhas; 25th Punjabis. Divisional Infantry: 13th BengalInfantry and 23rd Pioneers. Cavalry: nth Bengal Lancers and Guides' Cavalry.

Artillery : 3rd and Sth Mountain Batteries R.A., and DerajatMountain Battery.

Engineers, Bengal Sappers, and three companies R.E. Field Park (the Pioneers already mentionedwere also trained and provided with tools for road making).

Besides these troops, the East Lancashire Regiment and the 29th and 30th Punjabis were detailed to hold the line of communications under the command of General A. G. Hammond, V.C.

Three passes, each traversed only by rough mule paths, lead over crests, about 3,500 feet high, from the plain of Peshawur through the first range of hills into the Swat Valley. Of these it was decided not to use the most westward,the Mora Pass, for fear of disturbing the tribes in that neighbourhood. The choice lay between the two others, theMalakand and the Shahkot. It was hoped at first that, reassured by the Government proclamation, the Swat tribes wouldgive- free passage to the expedition. But on April ist, when Low was ready to advance, it was found that both passes were strongly held. The army had assembled at Nowshera, and on April ist and 2nd moved up to Dargai (not the Dargai that became famous ina latercampaign). Low's plan was to threaten the Shahkot and make his real attack by the Malakand.

In order thus to mislead the enemy into dividing his forces, Kinloch's brigade and the cavalry moved off in broad daylight on the 2nd to the soot of the ascent towards the Shahkot. The Brigadier had sealed orders to be opened after sunset. When he read them, he sound that they bade him leave the cavalry to watch the Shahkot andreturn with his infantry to the ground in front of the Malakand. That pass was attacked in force on the following morning, April 3rd. Theenemyhadconstructed numerous sungars or stone breastworks to sweep the path and its approaches, and had arranged heaps of stones along the crests of the slopes. It was afterwards ascertained that the force they had assembled was about 12,000 strong. Half had