THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 426 " That there should be frequent trials under forced draught to keep the blowers in good condition, and to make the men thoroughly familiarwithworkingundermaximumconditions. It appears that some of the ships had neverbeen under forced draught since their contract trials until the day of the fight at Santiago.

exceptionalmeasuresshould have beennecessary showshowill-prepared eventhe navy wasfor war.

Of the practical lessons derived from the experience of the naval campaign, those which have the greatest interest for British observers refer to the engineering department. These are set forth very clearly and briefly in the official report of Mr. Melville, the engineer-in-chief of theUnitedStatesNavy. So many of them have a direct bearing on questions that concern the efficiency of British naval preparations, that no excuse need be made for putting on record his conclusions. Heholds thatfor thenaval engineer these arethe mostimportantlessonsof the war:— "That the location of the forced-draught blowers is a matter of serious importance. In some of our ships, owing to the demands for all other space for other purposes, the blowershad to be located in corners or pockets in the fire rooms, whereit wasimpossible for humanbeings to give them proper attention, owing to the intense heat due to lack of ventilation. In the Cincinnati temperatures as high as 205 deg. Fahrenheit were noted, and the commanding officer,wheninvestigating thecasepersonally,had his face scorched. The blowers must beplaced where they can be properly cared for, or else they are useless, and might as well be left on shore.

" The vital necessityof giving the machinery of vessels in reservefrequent tests under working conditions, so that anydefectsmaybe discovered and remedied before war makes the vessel's services absolutely necessary. In several cases defects were found after the ships had begun cruising, and the repairs laid them ud in the midst of the war. " The great importance of havingallour naval stations in positions of strategic value properly fitted out for repairs and with adequatesupplies of non-perishable stores. It had been evident for along time thatKey7West wassucha station, but money to put in a proper repair plant was refused year after year, and only granted after the war had begun. The movement of large bodies of troops and their equipment almost blockedthe railroads, so thatafter the beginning of the war it was almostimpossible to secure the forwardingof tools and supplies.

"That the personnel of the service should be adequateto the materiel. It has been notorious for some time that this is not the case,and we are providing for a decided increase in the number of vessels with no increase whateverin thepersonnel. By sending nearly every officer on the active list to sea we wereable to givethe regular ships a fair complement of trained ones, but had the warbeen oflongdurationwe should have been greatly embarrassed to supply the placesofthose disabledorinvalided. Volunteers, however well trained in -other ways, cannot entirely-replace the regular officer. "That fresh water for the boilers is almost as important as coal, and that a distilling ship is an importantadjunct of a fleetoperating away from a base where fresh water can be readilyobtained.

"That we must make provision for training the enlisted men of the engineer department. Many of the colliersand auxiliary- vessels had to start out with absolutely green crews, many ot whom, so far from having the 'sea habit,' had never beenon a vessel of anv kind. This must beremediedif our enlargedfleetis to beefficient.

" That every fleet needs a repair ship to enable the efficiency to be maintained without leaving the station,andconsequentlythat several ships should be equipped so as to be ready to proceedwith the fleet. "That our sighting-ships must have the highest practicable speed. There is an almost general agreement on this point among naval men;but if any had thought that this did not apply to battleslaips, the fight at Santiago must have shown that the highest practicable speed is just as important in these vessels."

" Thegreat tactical advantages of water-tube boilers. "That if more than two main engines are to be fitted, there should be three engines driving three screws, and not two main enginesoneach shaft. The New York and Brooklyn had their forward engines disconnected at the timeof the Santiago sight, and could not stop to couple them. Anaccident to any part of either of the two engines on a shalt disables half the power; in the three-screw ship this fraction would be only a third.

But whatever were the minor defects of the navy it was in a state of splendid efficiency compared to the army. That had to be, as it were,improvised in the presence of the enemy. The want of a trained staff led to costly delays and blunders. The want of a medical service