SHAFTER'S CONFESSION OF FAILURE. 375 meant to see if the besiegers were on the alert.

It was met with a heavy rifle fire, and the attack was not pressed home, the Spaniards promptly retiring to their trenches. There were few casualties, but among those hit was General Hawkins, who was wounded in the soot.

he might be driven from his trenches by an attack in force. He was asking Sampson to enter the harbour mouth, but then the army had been sent to EasternCuba precisely because Sampson did not feel justified in attempting anything of the kind. No wonder men spoke of a possibledisaster to the American arms. By evening General Shafter hadrealised how serious was the situation, and in theearly hours of Sunday,July 3rd,he sent a seconddespatch to Washington, the publication of whichadded to the growing anxiety throughout the United States. He thus summedup the situation:— General Miles cabled to Shafter official congratulationson whathadbeen sofaraccomplished, and on"the recordmadeofmagnificent fortitude, gallantry, and sacrificedisplayed in the desperate fighting of the troops before Santiago." He announced that he was coming himself to Cuba with strong reinforcements, and would be in front ofSantiago withina week. Campnear Sevilla, Cuba, July 3.1898.

On the sameday orders wereissued for several volunteer regiments to leave the camps ot instruction and embark for Cuba. Retreat was not to be thought of under any circumstances-Is necessary,50,000 wouldbe sent. At the same time a belatedeffort was made to provide proper help for the wounded and the sick. General Miles had no intention of superseding Shafter; but he hoped to induce him to accept a planof operations that would give better results than a direct attack on Santiago.

" Via I'laya del Este.

"We have the town well invested onthe northand east, batwith a verv thin line. Upon approaching it, we find it ofsuch a character, and the defences so strong,it will beimpossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and Iam seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between SanJuan and Siboney, withour left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies to a large extent by means ot the railroad, which we can use,having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregatea thousand, but list has not yet been made ;but little sickness, outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday, and the almost constant sire which is kept up on the trenches. Waggon road to the rearis kept up with somedifficulty onaccount of therains. but Iwill be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill. and will probably have to go to therear to-day. General Young also very ill, confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot.

During sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed, thebehaviour of the regular troops was magnificent Iam urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbour, and willhave a consultation with him this morning, lie is coming to the front to see me. Ihavebeen unable tobe out during the heat of the day for four days,but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railway from Santiago San Luis, and has burned a bridge and removed somerails ; also that General Pandohas arrived at Palma, and that the French consul, with about sour hundred French citizens, came into his (Garcia's)lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them witheverycourtesy possible.

Hitherto the operations <>r the Americanarmy hadbeendirectedonanunsounelbasis. Santiago was not the object of the expedition. It was directed to quite another purpose— the forcing of Cervera's fleet out of the harbour. Now, military history affords a famous parallel to the situation. When the French Republicans were besieging Toulon in 1793,an English fleetlay in the harbour, and on that fleet depended the defence of the place. The Republican generals were embarking on a regular siege of the city, when the y<mng artillery officer who was afterwardsNapoleonI. pointed out that they might neglect all the other works andconcentrate their efforts on a single fort which commanded the harbour. If that were taken, the fleet must go, and the city would fall. His plan was adopted andproved completely successful. Thesituation at Santiago pointed to a similar solution. It bvious that if the sorts at the harbour month were taken, the torpedo defencecould be destroyed and Sampsein's licet could enter the harbour. So clear was this, that if there was any sign of the forts being in danger,Cervera would have to run out or stay to fight like a rat in a trap. Now the forts could beattacked with the co-operation of the fleet, and Miles's plan was to land troops near Cabanas,and, protected by Sampson's guns, march to the attack of the "Shafter, Major-General."

This despatch was an open confession of failure. He could not take Santiago;he was asking for leave to retreat to the hills near the coast. His losses were mounting up, and he himself and some of his generals were disabled by sickness. He was holding on to his works before Santiago" with a very thinline,'' and,as there was anexaggeratedidea at Washingtonof the Spanish forces in Santiago, it was felt that