THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 334 really formidable guns on the whole front were the three Hontorias. These were all that had even a chance of seriously injuring the opposing fleet. The other guns were only used to plav a game of bluff, and to make the attacking force believe that they were facing strongly armed batteries.

very few men, and the injuries to the batteries could be repaired in an hour. Several shells fh ing too high passed over the headlands and fell into the bay. Two struck the water opposite the public wharf of the city. Many more fell lower down the harbour, in the water or on the shore. One struck close to Ceivera's flagship, as she lay at her moorings near Ratones Cay, and sent up a fountain of water as high as her mast. At the Morro batteries one man was killed and six wounded; at the Socapa three were killed and four wounded. In all, there were fourteen casualties. Such is Ramsden's record of the day. One of the men killed at Socapa washit fairly by the exploding shell,and only half his body could be found. One of the guns in the battery was completely buriedby the mass of earth blownfrom the rampartby an explodingshell.

Nor was the torpedo defence of Santiago much more formidable than that by artillery. There were two lines of submarine mines at the entrance. One of seven mines ran from Socapa to the Estrella battery. It was protected by the battery of light quick-firers at Socapa, but the cables ran into Estrella,and the firing keys were there. Two,perhaps three, of these mines were exploded the night the Merrimac ran in, so that there must have been a serious gap in this outer line. The inner line of six mines ran from Socapa to Cay Smith, and the Reina Mercedes was for awhile mooredjust behind it, with her torpedo tubes pointed across the channel, so as to have a shot with them at anything that came round Socapa Point.

After the performances of the Vesuvius it was considereddangerous to keep such a heavy ship so near the harbour mouth, and she was taken further up the bay. There were no torpedoes in the channel between Cay Smith and Punta Gorda. It was blocked by a chain. It would not have been a difficult matter for the Americans to destroy this very imperfect mine field. When the Merrimacranin,theSpaniards suspected that she was towing a cable with a string of counter-mines behind her, and were surprised that no explosions followed in the channel. It was hoped that the shells of the Vesuvius would destroy some of the mines, but it is not certain that any of them were damaged in this way. The channel was supposed to be full of them, but there were never more than thirteen mines in position, just as there were nevermore than threearmour-piercing guns in the batteries.

Altogether the bombardmenthad proved as ineffectual as its predecessors. These results seem to suggest that even a first-class modern fleet would have a very rough experience if pitted against well-constructedforts armed with numerous heavyguns and servedby well-trained gunners. The Spanish forts at Santiago were partly edifices of antiquarian interest, partly hastily improvised earthworks. They were manned by ill-trained artillerists, who had evidently had very little peacepractice. But it is only fair to add that these Spanish gunners had to work with, for the most part, oldfashioned weapons, of short range and of no great accuracy, even in the best of hands.

Sampsonhad an idea that he had to deal with a formidablearray ofheavy guns of moderndate. We know now, after the event, what the armament of the sea front of Santiago was. Most of the guns at the Morro batteries were old and inefficientpieces,only fit for an artillery museum ora saluting battery. There were among them a few small Krupps, with an effective range of under 2,000 yards, and useless against armour. Theguns at Estrellaand Santa Catalina were of the same type. At Punta Gorda, in a new earthwork, there were three mortars with a range of 800 yards, intended to prevent the forcing of the channel, and one long-range Hontoriagun of six-inch calibre, taken from the Mercedes. At the Socapa there were in the upperbattery some old guns,and two more sixinch Hontorias. In anotherbattery,lower down the slope, there were some light modern quickfirers. These were mounted chiefly to protect the submarine mines in the entrance. The only It is curious that Admiral Sampson did not discover this state of things. It is still more curious that, having in his own estimation repeatedly silenced the batteries and found by actual experience that they always failed to damage his ships, he did not risk some ot his vessels in the attempt to force the entrance. With his enormous superiority of force hecould have afforded to take some risks. But he took none, although the experienceof the Merrimac attempt had shown that a large shipcould run rhe gauntlet of the batteries. His lack of