THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 324 ing the distance till the range was less than a mile and a half. The weather was so bad that to open at long range would have been useless. The first shots were fired from the big guns of theIowa at half-past seven, and the other ships then joined in, the firing being kept up heavily till ten. After that, till near three, some of the ships fired an occasional shot, but the main bombardment may be said to have lasted less than threehours.

Rico and in the Atlantic. The Columbia was repairing after seriouscollision with a merchant steamer. Sampson might at any moment have to detach part of his force for other operations, for there were persistent rumours that the second Spanish fleetunder AdmiralCamara had eitherleft or was on the point of leaving Cadiz. This squadron was to be made up of the' battleship Pelayo, the armoured cruisers Emperador Carlos Quinto,CardinalCisneros,andP'incipede Asiurias, the second-classcruisers Alfonso XIII.

andLepanto, and a number of armedliners and torpedo craft. Thefact, however, was that this second squadron was in a very backward state. This,however, wasnot fully realised in America, and the mere possibility of its appearance increased the anxiety to deal effectually and at once with Cervera.

The western squadron fired on Socapa and Morro, avoiding as far as possible the old tower of the fortress whereHobson was believed to be in prison. It also sent shells over the hills into the harbour. The easternsquadron attackedan earthwork battery recently constructed near Aguadores, a small town to the east of Morro. It also bombarded the light railway that runs along thecoast on this side, and sent a shower of shells here and there into the country between Santiago and the sea. The Admiral's report on the day's work claimed a complete success. This was his telegraphic despatch to Washington:— On Sunday,June 5th, Admiral Sampson sent in a letter to the Governor ofSantiago, General Linares, demanding the surrender of the city within twenty-four hours,under threat of bombardment. Linares answered proudly that he would not surrenderwithin ten years. Accordingly Admiral Sampson prepared to bombard theforts and the harbour. He had received an intimation from Washington that a land force would be sent to enable him to capture the place,and he therefore began a series of reconnaissances with a view to selecting a point for disembarkation. If heavy siege guns could be placed on the neighbouring hills, the city and the Spanish fleet would be at their mercy, or if the fortsat the entrance of the port could be silenced and demolished and the mine field destroyed, the fleet could force the passage into the harbour. The work of thefleet in the next few days wasintendedas a preliminary to these operations.

"June 7,1S98. "Secretary ofthe Navy, Washington "Bombarded forts at Santiago de Cuba half-past seven to ten a.m., June 6. Have silenced works quickly, without injury ofanykind, though within 2,000 yards. "Sampson."

The newspaper reports enlargea on tnis. According to them," Santiago hadbeen shelled into silence," and its sea forts were utterly wrecked.

Without havingthe least desire to depreciate the exploitsof the UnitedStates,it is welltotry to estimate these bombardments at their true value and see both sides of the case. For sooneror later some of our own coast towns may have to face the threat of bombardment, andit is wellthat undue panic should be obviated by definiteknowledgeof what is likely to happenin such a case. It maybe safely asserted that this great bombardment of the Santiago forts was absolutely without results. The despatch of General Linares,in whichhe reported toMadrid that the damage done was unimportant, was ridiculed at the time, but it is completely confirmed by the independent testimonyof Consul Ramsden. In the first place the Spanish batterieswerenot silenced for the simple reason that they never made any serious attempt to return the fire. Ramsden noted in his diary on the qth :— " The news telegramssay that Sampson reports havingsilenced the forts here. As a The weather was very bad on the Monday morning when the American fleet steamed in towards the sea forts of Santiago in two lines, clearedfor action. It wasoppressively hot, rain was falling, and at times the heat and wet formeda dense mistupon the sea. Of the two lines, that to the eastward, led by Admiral Sampson in person, was formed by the New York, Oregon,Lowa, New Orleans, and the auxiliary cruiser Yankee, thislast largely mannedby naval reserve volunteers. The western line,led by Commodore Schley, was made up of the Brooklyn, Texas,Massachusetts,andMarblchead.

The two lines began to steam in towards the landat six a.m., forming inbattle array some six miles from Morro Castle,andgradually diminish-