COMMODORE SCHLEY'S MOVEMENTS 311 did not intend to move from this port, as it is evidently taking up a position near the entrance, so as to command it in case of attack."

brilliant success had been so confidently predicted at the outset.

There had been only one real victory of the (east importance, and that hadbeen won, not by the powerful Atlantic fleets, but by Dewey's squadron in the far-off Philippines, and even there the full fruits of victory had not yet been reaped. Manila was still defiant, and the Pacific squadron was anxiously waiting for reinforcements before attempting to follow up its first good fortune. The record of the war in the West Indies had nothing to show but indecisive bombardments like theattacks on Matanzas and San Juan, and repeated failures to directly cooperatewith the insurgents. These had effected nothing whatever since the war began. Blanco held Havana with a large army, and it was recognised that it would be a piece of rashness to assail him in his stronghold. Cervera had baffled all the precautions taken by the navy, and had reached the West Indies, and Schley was still searching for his exact position. Even the efforts made to cut the telegraphic communications of the Spaniards had failed. One dayit was announced that the Cienfuegos cables were cut, and that Blanco could no longer communicate with Madrid and the rest of the world. The very next day the New York papers contained Spanish messages sent to Madrid over these very cables, via Cienfuegos. Then the War Department had as yet no armyready for the field beyond the regular regiments which were under arms when the war began. There was a deficiency of organisation and a woeful lack of transports at Tampa. All that hadbeen done for the much-talked-of invasion of Cuba was thelanding of a small body of refugees with a supply of arms near Banes,in the east end of the island. The filibusters had accomplished as much, and more, before the war was declared.

It was, indeed,incredible that the fleet should allow its collier to be thus taken underits very eyes,at a moment when coal was all-important, without even attempting to assist her to get in. Yetthis waswhathappened,andequallyincredible things were tohappen later on. But for all that, Cervera and his captains were as brave men as ever stepped on to the deck of a warship. Bravery, however, is not the greatest of a commander's qualifications. Without a certain energeticinitiative,and a watchfulreadiness for chances of successful action, it is more likely to lead to disaster than success.

Let usnow turn to what the Americans were doing. Commodore Schley's squadron hadrun down south as soon as it was known that the Spaniards had reached West Indian waters. Besides some smaller ships, he had with him the powerful armoured cruiser Brooklyn, which carried his flag; the battleships Texas and Massachusetts, the swift cruisers Minneapolis and Columbia, and several of the armed liners. He detached the Columbia to patrol the North Atlantic coast, for there were vague rumoursof Spanish cruisers making for northern waters. The Harvard, the Yale, and the St. Paul were cruising in the Windward Passage and along the east end of Cuba. The heavier ships entered the Yucatan Channel. On the 18th Sampson came -into Key West, and Schley steamed along the southern coast of Cuba, looking into Cienfuegos, where a fresh crop of rumours nowplaced Cervera's fleet. TheIowa, detached from Sampson's squadronto strengthen his colleague, joined Schley off that port. On the afternoon of Sunday, the 22nd, Cienfuegos was closely reconnoitred, and it was definitely ascertained that there was nothing bigger than agunboatin the port. The fleet then steamed slowly eastward, picking up on its way the cruisers that had been blockading the south coast, and sweeping with its scouts the waters of the Caribbean Sea. No credence was as yet attached to the report that Cervera was at anchor at Santiago.

This reconnaissance ofCienfuegos came just a month after the day on which Sampson's fleet had first appearedbefore Havana. So far, the course of the war in the Atlantic had been distinctly disappointing for the United States, a'l the more disappointing because early and It is easy to understand the eagerness of the Atlantic fleet to put an end to this record of inaction and comparative failure. Schley hoped to meet and fight the enemy ih the Caribbean Sea. The very eagerness of his hope madehim at first reluctant to believethat the Spanish admiral had shut himself up in Santiago. It was one of Schley's gunboats, the Scorpion, that watched the entrance to the bay on the Sunday morning after Cervera ran in. It was one of his armed liners, the St. Paul, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, of the Maine, that chased and captured the collier in sight of MorroCastle on May 25th, when the Spaniards were so strangely inactive. The captured ship