8 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR alike are able to produce decisive results in war when they can move. To be locked up in a harbour is for a fleet what it is for an army to be blockaded in a fortress. And so it maybe said that, though there is no doubt of Admiral Cervera's loyalty tohis governmentand country, and his faults were errors of judgment and the lack of enterprise, Santiago became for his fleet and for Spain what Metzproved tobe forFrance and the army of the Rhine in the war of 1870— a seeming place of refuge and safety, but really the entranceto the wide roadthatled tohopeless disaster.

to Bayamo. Santiago is a busy port, and its natural features make it all but impregnable. It was for this stronghold that Cervera laid his course from Curacoa. Santiago was to be, he hoped, his new base of operations for the naval campaign.

If he had used it merely as a base, a startingpoint for a raid upon the scattered ships of the blockading squadron, or upon theNorth Atlantic ports of the United States,hisdashintoSantiago would have been a piece of sound policy. But as weshall see,he allowed himself to beimprisoned in the land-locked harbour. Fleets and armies ENTRANCE TO THE HARUOUR, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.