MAHAN ON THE VALUE OF PUERTO RICO. 297 upon her home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thus entailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposed everywhere throughout its course, but especially to the molestation of small cruisers issuing from the harbours of Puerto Rico, which flank the routesand wdiich,upon thesupposition, would have passed into our hands. This view of the matter was urgedupon the writer, a few days before hostilities began, by a very old and Puerto Rico should never be lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, direct or indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico, considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian canal,and to our Pacific coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the beyond ;and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthen the one, in its entirety andin its immediatesurroundings, that there is for Great Britain to hold the other intelligent navalofficer whohadservedinourown navy and in that of the Confederate States. To for the security of her position in Egypt,for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control of the route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a European State to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with a British fleet at Malta. Similarly, it would be very difficult for a Transatlantic State to maintain operations in the Western Caribbean with a United States fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands. The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in his expedition against Egypt and India in 17198. In his masterly eye*, as in those of Nelson, it was essential to the communications between France, Egypt, and India. His scheme failed, not because Malta was less than invaluable,but a European nation the argument must have been quite decisive;for to it,as distant,or more distant than bpain from Cuba, such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountable obstacle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable base if wrested from him. To the United States these considerations were applicable only in part ; for, while the inconvenience to Spain wouldbe the same, thegain to us would be but little,as our lines of communication to Cuba neitherrequired the support of Puerto Rico, nor were by it particularly endangered. Ihis estimate of the military importance of