THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 294 Though the newspapers had spoken of a move upon Havana in ten days, it was soon recognised that anything on a large scale could not be attempted for a long time to come. But it was hoped that someminorexpeditions might be despatched to the help of the Cuban insurgents. The refugees from the island were assembled in the camp at Tampa, armed, equipped, and brigaded under Cuban officers.

An effort was made to raise a force of volunteers from the Southern States, formed of men whohad survived anattack of yellow fever, and were therefore proof against renewed]infection. It was expected that the first move on Cuba would be made by a mixed force of Cubans, Southerners, negroes belonging to the regular army. This would doubtless have been done had not the course of events precipitated the attempt at invasionon a large scale. The minor expeditions that preceded it had very little result. Early in May a small expedition was embarked in the transport steamer Gussie, to convey arms and ammunition to the insurgents in the province of Pinar del Rio at the western end of Cuba. The chances of success were reduced to a minimum even before the Gussie sailed. There was a crowdof newspaper correspondents at Tampa, and practically no censorship. They described,in detail,the preparations of the Gussie expedition and discussed itsplans, so that Marshal Blanco was provided with all the information he could wish for in order to frustrate it.

in sight. The guns of the armedships opened on them. The soldiers on the Gussie joined in with their long-ranging rifles,and the Spaniards retreated to the woods. Dorst then landed with his infantry, but soon found that it was useless to attempt to run thecargo ashore. The enemy held theedge of the woods andkept up a sharp, well-directedfire, in the face of which it was found to be impossible to advance from the beach. Attempts to shell them out of the woods proved unavailing. They could not fail to be soon reinforced, so that to move the convoy of arms inland would be to risk its capture. Dorst therefore re-embarkedhis men,not without loss,and after hoveringalong the coast for a few days more, looking for another chance, the Gussie returnedto Tampa.

A better devised andmore successful attempt would no doubt have followed, but by the middle of May the course of the naval war forced the military authorities into a complete change of plans. Santiago, and not Havana, became the centre ofinterest,and,at allhazards, a largearmyhad to be embarkedfor Cuba.

The troops actually available for operations hadbeen already drawnuponinorder to embark a land force for the Philippines. This became necessary as soon as it wasrealised that the fleet alone could not enforce the surrender of Manila, and that evenif it could,there wouldhave been grave danger in leaving the great city at the mercy of Aguinaldo and his bloodthirstyfollowing of half-civilisedrebels. The commandof the expedition was entrusted to General Wesley Merritt, who stood nextto General Miles in the list ofgeneralofficers of the UnitedStates Army, and who had before the warbeen in command of the Department of the East, with his headquarters at New York. Merritt had had a regular military training, graduating at West Point, and seeing his first active service in the Civil War, when he was a young officer of twenty-five. He rose rapidly to the command, first of abrigade, then of a division,and proved himself a brilliant cavalry commander. He was sent to San Francisco to organise the army for the Philippine expedition.

The Gussie was freightedwith 7,000rifles and a large quantity of cartridges and other warlike stores. These supplies were to be escorted to theinsurgent camp in Pinar del Rio by a party of 100 United States regulars, under the command of Captain Dorst. He was accompanied by a small party of Cubans, whose local knowledge was expected to be of use to him. The Gussiesailed on May nth from Tampa, and off the Cuban coast she was joinedby a couple of gunboats. The little flotilla then cruised along the shore, endeavouring to communicate with themessengers of the insurgents, and to find a landing-place where the cargo could be run ashore without interruption. But the Spanish watch on the coasts was so effective that this proved to be impossible, and it was determined to try to force a landing at apoint near Cabanas, where the Spaniards were reported not to be very strong or on the alert. But no sooner had the three ships approached the shore than a body ofSpanish infantry andcavalry appeared Itwas at firstintended that the army destined for the reduction of Manila should consist almost entirely of volunteer battalions and batteries from the Pacific states. From the very outset the gravity of the position in the Philippines was underrated at Washington. At the e>utset General Alger and the War Department proposed to giveMerritt only threeor fourthousand