THE RECONOUEST OF THE SOUDAN. 147 most powerful and well equippedforce that had ever been gathered on one field in the whole course of theMahdist movement. With a wiser policy the Khalifa might have possessed a still more formidable force for the defence of his capital. If he had not wasted in the useless raids on the Atbara Mahmoud's 20,000 fighting men; if he had not by his tyranny alienated the warlikeJaalin,he might wellhave mustered a hundred thousand warriors before Omdurman.

practically no artillery. The Khalifa had mounted most of his Krupp guns in the riversidebatteries. He had left many of them lying like useless lumber in his arsenal. The only cannon he brought out with him were three small Krupps, and even for these he had such poor ammunition that their shells fell short.

He had also a Nordenfeldt machine-gun, but such little use was made of it that it wasonly when the battle was over that anyone in the Anglo-Egyptian army suspected that it had been in action. If the Khalifa had had with him a few trained officers, his army would have been a far moredangerous fightingforce.

Even as it was,he had gathered under his black banner a forcethat wasnot to be despised. There werethe Mulazemin,drilled black troops under Arab leaders, men of the same stamp as filled the ranks of the Sirdar's Soudanese regiments. These and the Jehadia, or Dervish regulars, enrolled for the Jehad,or sacred war, were all armed with Remington rifles— a very fair type of breechloader,of simple construction and easy to keep in order, which hadbeen the weaponof the old Egyptian army. There were about 30,000 of these riflemen, but, happily for us, the qualityof the cartridge and the training of the man who holds the rifle, and of the officer who directs his sire, are more important factors in the result than the structure of the weapon itself. The cartridges manufactured in the Khalifa's workshops were very defective and loaded with bad powder;the riflemen never had any target practice, and mostly regarded the sights of their Remingtons as useless appendages; and their leaders had never heard of such a thing as infantry sire tactics. The result was that the fire of theJehadia was only dangerous at close quarters.

It was ascertainedfrom prisoners later on that the Khalifa had intended to meet the Sirdar's army at Kerreri, but he had had to give up that plan as he was surprised by the rapid advance of the main body. Its movements nad been so well screened by Broadwood's .avalry that the enemy never suspected it had come so near. When the Mahdist army moved out of Omdurman, the men in the Sirdar's camp had stood to their arms, and they waited for some time, eagerly expecting to see tiie Dervish banners showing over the low ridges in front. But the Khalifa had halted, „nd was apparently in no hurry to attack. The gunboats came back and reported that without losing a man they had wrecked the Khalifa's forts and shelled his palace, and that the friendlies had cleared the east bank. At three the cavalryscoutsreported thathe wasbivouacking between Omdurman and Jebel Surgham, about three and a half miles away, and that the Dervishes had lit fires and were busy em.king. Later on deserters or spies from Omdurman declared that the Khalifa was waiting for the night to come in order to attack the camp in the darkness.

The riflemen were supplemented by some 20,000 spear and swordsmen, some thousands of whom werehorsemen of the Baggara tribe, wdio are among the most daring warriors and the best cavaliers in all savage Africa. There was