THE RECONOUEST OF THE SOUDAN. 87 during the long, slow retirement. Nevertheless, the Egyptians behaved very steadily, and when Broadwood made another charge at the head of Major Le Gallais's and Captain Persse's squadrons the fellahin troopers came on splendidly, and dashed boldly into the foremost mass of Dervishes, driving them back with many a riderless horse to show how well the Egyptian peasant had learned to use the lance. Persse was wounded in the charge by a bullet striking zereba was formed. Covered by his screen of cavalry, and all unknown to his adversary,he was thus gradually approaching Mahmoud's position. He hadcrept up like a lionpreparing tor a spring, and he was now within striking distance.

His plan was, except for the omission of the flanking column, the same that had worked so well at Firket. The Anglo-Egyptian army was tomarch on the eveningof the 7th, bivouac at a previously-selected point near the enemy's lines, march off againin the early morning, and attack soon after dawn. Aplace called Mutrus, some nine miles out, and near a bend of the Atbara, where there were large pools of good water, was selected as the place for the halt during the night-march.

him in the right arm, but luckily the bone was notbroken.

After this charge the Dervishes kept at a more respectful distance, and contented themselves withfollowingthe retreat atlong range. Hunter halted from time to time and sent a few shells amongst them as they showed through the bush.

At last the supporting infantry joined the cavalry, and the Dervishes galloped off to their camp.

There hadbeen much discussion as tohow the storming columns were to get over or through the huge thorn hedgeof Mahmoud's zereba. A thorn entanglement is in some respects a more formidable obstacle than a wall or a bank of earth. One cannot breach it or set it on sire with artillery, and climbing over it is not an easy matter. The native methodof attacking a zereba isa curiouspiece of tactics. Thestormers bringup with them a number of angareebs— bedsteadsmadeof an oblong frame on four legs, with a network of leathern thongs wovenacross it. The attack is made in the dark. Fire is opened now on one side of the zereba, now on theother,and whenthe attention of thegarrison has been thus distracted from the real point of attack, up rush the spearmen with the angareebs in front, put them on top of the thorns, and charge in over them. The bedstead thus becomes a scaling ladder or temporary bridge. But to supply bedsteads enough for the Sirdar's long line of attack would have seriously embarrassed the transport, so blankets were taken instead, packed in bales on mule-back, and intended to be laid on top of the thorn' hedge of Mahmoud's zereba. There were also short scaling ladders, but more useful than either ladder or blanket were several hundred pairs of thick leathergloves, which were to be wornby men and officers in the front rank to enable them to grasp the thorn rampart and pull it clown, a risky task when the other side of the was thickly lined with Dervish rifles and spears Mahmoud seems to have considered the day a victory for his army. After the battle of the Atbara he said he was not afraidof the cavalry, he knew he could beat them again as he had beaten them before. It is a necessary drawback of all reconnaissances in force that even when they are a perfect success they give this impression to the enemy against whom they arcdirected. He sees troops approach in battle array and open fire upon him; he goes out to meet them and they retire before him, standing from time to time to make a short Æght, and then continuing their retreat. EvenEuropean generals, who understand the nature of the operation,have often claimed a victory on the strength of such an experience. No wonder if the Emir took the same view. But even at the cost of giving the Dervishes some little encouragement, their position had to be reconnoitred. Mahmoud seems to have been lulled int.. false security by the retirementof the Egyptian cavalry. Twice they had approached his camp in force, twice they had gone back without attacking him. He concluded that the Sirdar was adopting his own tactics of waiting in his entrenchedcamp for reinforcementsandsupplies.

So the Emir sent off thehalf of hiscavalry along the Atbara to the south-east, where there was better grazingground for the horses. Theyhad orders to rejoin him on the Saturday; but ma things were tohappen before that.

Early on Wednesday morning, April 6th, the Sirdar again broke up his camp and made another short march along the Atbara bank to the ruined village of Umdabiya, where a new Thursday was a busy day in the Sirdar's camp at Umdabiya. Though it was late beforedefinite orderswereissued, wordhad gone roundthat the morrow—Good Friday morning— would see the