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94 t riverain or nomad, and the southern by negroid Central African tribes, less civilised and less closely administered. The military garrison consisted of about 14,000 men of the Egyptian army, .composed of Egyptian, black and Arab regular units scattered in detachnaents over 'the country, with headquarters in Khartoum, where there was also a small British force consisting of a battalion of infantry and a detachment of garrison artillery.
From the point of view of productivity the Soudan may be described as consisting of three zones, the northern being the desert region where cultivation is confined for the most part to a strip along each bank of the Nile artificially irrigated, but where the desert pasture lands support large herds of sheep and camels belonging to nomhd tribes. The central zone is tne fertile belt which includes the rainlands oi Kassala, the Gezira Plain, and the m forests and pasture lands of Kordofan. This belt is watered by a regular annual rainfall, varying nevertheless greatly from year to year in amount. Through the centre of this belt flow the Blue and White Niles' enclosing the Gezira or island plain. These rivers are but little used for cultivation, the people depending almost exclusively on the rains.
The southern or equatorial belt is pinbably the richest of the three, but its development is handicapped by lack of communication over the enormous distances to be traversed, the slender nature of the administration, and the indolence and lack of enterprise of the majority of the negroid tribes.
1914 was a bad year for the north and centre of the country. The 1913 rains were scanty and the Nile flood abnormally low, so that the supply of grain (millet) was very short, and famine conditions appeared in several districts of Dongola, the Blue Nile and White Nile provinces. In these districts, during the period of distress frorn May till November, the work of the administration was centred on famine relief measures. The situation was greatly restored by the importation of large quantities of millet from India. This step made a deep impression on the natives, which' was not without its effect during the critical time of the war when they were called upon to produce supplies for export to Egypt for the use of the British troops.
Rains and flood, however, in the autumn of 1914 were excellent, and the people, busy with the prospect of a good season, paid little heed to the outbreak of war. Those religious and tribal leaders who were capable of, appreciating the issues involved offered expressions of loyalty and confidence, and the only anxiety was to know what would be the effect of the imminent breach with Turkey on a people composed principally of Moslems.
Meanwhile several necessary precautions were taken. A censorship was established. The garrison of certain posts were strengthened and a more frequent and effective system of patrols iiistituted, particularly on the Red Sea Coast and the Abyssinian frontier. Martial law was reaffirmed, and legislation was introduced to strengthen the hands of the administration in dealing with emergencies, and to prevent trading with the .enemy.
Any anxiety the Government may have felt proved to have been only partially founded. The actual outbreak of hostilities with Turkey caused no excitement, and messages were received from all over the country affirming the loyalty of the people and their trust in the Government.
The one region affected by the entry of Turkey into the war was .Darfur. Ali Dinar, the Sultan, was persuaded that the Soudan Government was not strong enough to deal with him, and thiat his chance of cutting himself free from our suzerainty had arrived. After several defiant letters he formally renounced his allegiance. Further, at the direct instigation of the Turkish Mission to the Sennoussi he started to plan an invasion of the Soudan to be carried out simultaneously with the Sennoussist attack on Egypt.
It was not convenient to take action against him immediately, but the situation was secured against the Sennoussi by the establishment of a cordon of native irrear posts to prevent communications between the Sennoussi country and the Soudan, and to intercept any caravans of arms that might attempt to pass along the Arbain road to Darfur.
At the beginning of 1916 the attitude and warlike preparations of Ali Dinar were such that they could not be neglected without running the risk of alienating the loyalty of our western tribesmen, and thus starting disaffection which might run through the whole country. Accordingly a force was concentrated at Nahud, in Western Kordofan, by the middle of March, and operations were initiated which resulted in a crushing defeat to his forces on the 22nd May, and terminated in the death; of Ali Dinar himself on the 6th November, 1916, and the occupation of his country.
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