The ambitions of British policy After the escalation of the conflict between Egypt and France over Fashoda, and before the agreement between England and France, the English asked in March 1898: "What should England do?" England and France reached an agreement.

They were left with no rival or opponent. They asked themselves: "What should we do? Should we annex Sudan to our possessions? Or if we do, what is the point?" They feared the opposition of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. They said: "If England annexes Sudan to its possessions, Sudan will be like a boat with a thin thread attached to it. With a light pair of scissors, that thin thread can be cut. And a blow to the Nile will divert its water or some of its water from Egypt." The proponents of this opinion said that if England annexes Sudan to its possessions, it will not do anything new, but rather turn the temporary into permanent. Did it not raise its flag over Uganda, the equator, Bahr el Ghazal, and Khartoum? Did its soldiers not reach Omdurman and Khartoum?

However, other people advised against annexation, and the government began to weigh the pros and cons and the risks. It did not look at the issue from a legal perspective, nor at the dates of withdrawal, nor at similar matters. Rather, it looked at the benefit. In March 1898, Lord Cromer's opinion was decisive in reaching an agreement with France.

Here is a summary of his report for 1898: "Sudan is a pit that swallows millions. It is like ice melting in the sun, it is the cause of Egyptian finances and weakness." This statement became the basis of their policy thereafter.

England has spent enormous sums of money. The House of Commons decided in 1898, when settling accounts, to allocate 100,000 pounds to save Gordon. This small amount arrived.